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Abstract
We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a ‘lie that ϕ’ (where ϕ is a formula
in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a
state transformer relative to the formula ϕ. The states that are being transformed are
pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies
can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs
of other agents or the belief consequences of the lies of other agents. We distinguish (i)
an outside observer who is lying to an agent that is modelled in the system, from (ii)
one agent who is lying to another agent, and where both are modelled in the system.
For either case, we further distinguish (iii) the agent who believes everything that
it is told (even at the price of inconsistency), from (iv) the agent who only believes
what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs, and from (v) the agent
who believes everything that it is told by consistently revising its current beliefs. The
logics have complete axiomatizations, which can most elegantly be shown by way of
their embedding in what is known as action model logic or the extension of that logic
to belief revision.
1 Introduction
My favourite of Grimm’s fairytales is ‘Hans im Glu¨ck’ (Hans in Luck). A close second
comes ‘The Ditmarsch Tale of Wonders’. In German this is called a ‘Lu¨genma¨rchen’, a
‘Liar’s Tale’. It is as follows.
I will tell you something. I saw two roasted fowls flying; they flew quickly and
had their breasts turned to Heaven and their backs to Hell; and an anvil and a
mill-stone swam across the Rhine prettily, slowly, and gently; and a frog sat on
the ice at Whitsuntide and ate a ploughshare.
Four fellows who wanted to catch a hare, went on crutches and stilts; one of
them was deaf, the second blind, the third dumb, and the fourth could not stir a
step. Do you want to know how it was done? First, the blind man saw the hare
running across the field, the dumb one called to the deaf one, and the lame one
seized it by the neck.
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There were certain men who wished to sail on dry land, and they set their sails
in the wind, and sailed away over great fields. Then they sailed over a high
mountain, and there they were miserably drowned.
A crab was chasing a hare which was running away at full speed; and high up
on the roof lay a cow which had climbed up there. In that country the flies are
as big as the goats are here.
Open the window that the lies may fly out. [19]
A passage like “A crab was chasing a hare which was running away at full speed; and
high up on the roof lay a cow which had climbed up there.” contains very obvious lies.
Nobody considers it possible that this is true. Crabs are reputedly slow, hares are reputedly
fast.
In ‘The Ditmarsch Tale of Wonders’, none of the lies are believed.
In the movie ‘The Invention of Lying’1 the main character Mark goes to a bank counter
and finds out he only has $300 in his account. But he needs $800. Lying has not yet been
invented in the 20th-century fairytale country of this movie — that however seems to be
in a universe very parellel to either the British Midlands or Brooklyn New York. Then
and there, on the spot, Mark invents lying. We see some close-ups of Mark’s braincells
doing heavy duty—such a thing has not happened before. And then, Mark tells the bank
employee assisting him that there must be a mistake: he has $800 in his account. He is
lying. She responds, oh well, then there must be a mistake with your account data, because
on my screen it says you only have $300. I’ll inform system maintenance of the error. My
apologies for the inconvenience. And she gives him $800! In the remainder of the movie,
Mark gets very rich.
Mark’s lies are not as unbelievable as those in Grimm’s fairytale. It is possible that
he has $800. It is just not true. Still, there is something unrealistic about the lies in
this movie: new information is believed instantly. New information is even believed if
it is inconsistent with prior information. After Mark’s invention of lying while obtaining
$800, he’s trying out his invention on many other people. It works all the time! There are
shots wherein he first announces a fact, then its negation, then the fact again, while all
the time his extremely credulous listeners keep believing every last announcement. New
information is also believed if it contradicts direct observation. In a cafe´, in company of
several of his friends, he claims to be a one-armed bandit. And they commiserate with
him, oh, I never knew you only had one arm, how terrible for you. All the time, Mark is
sitting there drinking beer and gesturing with both hands while telling his story.
In the movie ‘The Invention of Lying’, all lies are believed.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Invention_of_Lying
2
In the real world, if you lie, sometimes other people believe you and sometimes they
don’t. When can you get away with a lie? Consider the consecutive numbers riddle [25].
Anne and Bill are each going to be told a natural number. Their numbers will
be one apart. The numbers are now being whispered in their respective ears.
They are aware of this scenario. Suppose Anne is told 2 and Bill is told 3.
The following truthful conversation between Anne and Bill now takes place:
• Anne: “I do not know your number.”
• Bill: “I do not know your number.”
• Anne: “I know your number.”
• Bill: “I know your number.”
Explain why is this possible.
Initially, Anne is uncertain between Bill having 1 or 3, and Bill is uncertain between Anne
having 2 or 4. So both Anne and Bill do not initially know their number.
Suppose that Anne first says to Bill: “I know your number.” Anne is lying. Bill does
not consider it possible that Anne knows his number. However, Anne did not know that
Bill would not believe her. She considered it possible that Bill had 1, in which case Bill
would have considered it possible that Anne was telling the truth, and would then have
drawn the incorrect conclusion that Anne had 0.
Alternatively, suppose that the first announcement, Anne’s, is truthful, but that Bill
is lying in the second announcement and says to Anne: “I know your number.” If Anne
believes that, she will then say “I know your number,” as she believes Bill to have 1. Her
announcement is an honest mistake, because this belief is incorrect. However, as a result
of Anne’s announcement Bill will learn Anne’s number, so that his announcement “I know
your number,” that was a lie at the time, now has become true.
That is, if you are still following us.
It seems not so clear how all this should be formalized in a logic interpreted on epistemic
modal structures, and this is the topic of our paper.
In real life, some lies are believed and some are not.
1.1 The modal dynamics of lying
What is a lie? Let p be a proposition. You lie to me that p, if you believe that p is false
while you say that p, and with the intention that I believe p. The thing you say we call
the announcement. If you succeed in your intention, I believe p, and I also believe that
your announcement of p was truthful, i.e., that you believed that p when you said that p.
In this investigation we abstract from the intentional aspect of lying. Such an abstraction
seems reasonable. It is similar to that in AGM belief revision [2], wherein one models how
to incorporate new information in an agent’s belief set, but abstracts from the process that
made the new information acceptable to the agent. Our proposal is firmly grounded in
modal logic. We employ dynamic epistemic logic [44].
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Preconditions What are the modal preconditions and postconditions of a lie? Let us for
now assume that p itself is not a modal proposition but a Boolean proposition. We further
assume two agents, a and b. Agent a will be assumed female and agent b will be assumed
male. Typically, in our exposition a will be the speaker or sender and b will be the receiver
or addressee. However, a and b are not agent roles but agent names (and agent variables).
We also model dialogue wherein agents speak in turn; so these roles may swap. Formula
Bap stand for ‘agent a believes that p’. We use belief modalities B and not knowledge
modalities K, because lying results in false beliefs, whereas knowledge modalities are used
for correct beliefs.
The precondition of ‘a is lying that p to b’ is Ba¬p (¬ is negation). Stronger precon-
ditions are conceivable, e.g., that the addressee considers it possible that the lie is true,
¬Bb¬p, or that the speaker believes that, Ba¬Bb¬p. These conditions may not always hold
while we still call the announcement a lie, because the speaker may not know whether the
additional conditions are satisfied. We therefore will only require precondition Ba¬p.
We should contrast the announcement that p by a lying agent with other forms of
announcement. Just as a lying agent believes that p is false when it announces p, a
truthful agent believes that p is true when it announces p. The precondition for a lying
announcement by a is Ba¬p, and so the precondition for a truthful announcement by a
is Bap. Here, were should put up some strong terminological barriers in order to avoid
pitfalls and digressions into philosophy and epistemology. Truthful is synonymous with
honest. Now dictionaries, that report actual usage, do not make a difference between an
agent a telling the truth and an agent a believing that she is telling the truth. A modal
logician has to make a choice. We mean the latter, exclusively. A truthful announcement
may therefore not be a true announcement. If p is false but agent a mistakenly believes
that p, then when she says p, that is a truthful but false announcement of p. Besides the
truthful and the lying announcement there is yet another form of announcement, because
in modal logic there are always three instead of two possibilities: either you believe p, or
you believe ¬p, or you are uncertain whether p. The last corresponds to the precondition
¬(Bap∨Ba¬p) (∨ is disjunction). An announcement wherein agent a announces p while she
is uncertain about p we propose to call a bluffing announcement. The dictionary meaning
for the verb bluff is ‘to cause to believe what is untrue’ or ‘to deceive or to feign’ in a more
general sense. Its meaning is even more intentional than that of lying. Feigning belief in
p means suggesting belief in p, by saying it, or otherwise behaving in accordance to it,
although you do not have this belief. This corresponds to ¬Bap as precondition. This
would make lying a form of bluffing, as Ba¬p implies ¬Bap. It is common and according
to Gricean conversational norms to consider that saying something that you believe to be
false is worse than (or, at least, different from) saying something that you do not believe to
be true. This brings us to ¬Bap∧¬Ba¬p (∧ is conjunction), equivalent to ¬(Bap∨Ba¬p).
To the three mutually exclusive (and complete) preconditions Bap, Ba¬p, and ¬(Bap∨
Ba¬p) we associate the truthful, lying, and bluffing announcement that p, and we call
the announcing agent a truthteller, liar and bluffer, respectively.2 The three forms of
2Here again, it is stretching usage that a truthteller may not be telling the truth but only what she
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announcement are intricately intertwined. This is obvious: to a credulous addressee a lying
announcement appears to be a truthful announcement, whereas a skeptical addressee, who
already believed the opposite of the announcement, has to make up his mind whether the
speaker is merely mistaken, or is bluffing, or is even lying.
Postconditions We now consider the postconditions of ‘a is lying that p to b’. If a’s
intention to deceive b is successful, b believes p after the lie. Therefore, Bbp should be a
postcondition of a successful execution of the action of lying. Also, the precondition should
be preserved: Ba¬p should still true after the lie. In the first place, we propose logics to
achieve this. However, this comes at a price. In case the agent b already believed the
opposite, Bb¬p, then b’s beliefs are inconsistent afterwards. (This merely means that b’s
accessibility relation is empty, not that the logic is inconsistent.) There are two different
solutions for this: either b does not change his beliefs, so that Bb¬p still holds after the
lie, or the belief Bb¬p is given up in order to consistently incorporate Bbp. The three
alternative postconditions after the lie that p are therefore: (i) always make Bbp true after
the lie (even at the price of inconsistency), (ii) only make Bbp true if agent b considered p
possible before the lie (¬Bb¬p), and (iii) always make Bbp true by a consistency preserving
process of belief revision. These are all modelled.
Lying as a dynamic modal operator The preconditions and postconditions of lying
may contain epistemic modal operators (belief modalities). The action of lying itself is
modelled as a dynamic modal operator. The dynamic modal operator for ‘lying that p’
is interpreted as an epistemic state transformer. An epistemic state is a pointed Kripke
model (a model with a designated state) that encodes the beliefs of the agents. An epistemic
action ‘agent a lies that p to agent b’ should transform an epistemic state satisfying Ba¬p
into an epistemic state satisfying Bbp and Ba¬p. The execution of such dynamic modal
operators for epistemic actions depends on the initial epistemic state and that operator’s
description only. In that sense, they are different from dynamic modal operators for (PDL-
style) actions that are interpreted using an accessibility relation in a given structure.
In this dynamic epistemic setting we can distinguish (i) the case of an external observer
(an agent who is not explicitly modelled in the structures and in the logical language),
who is lying to an agent modelled in the system, from (ii) the case of one agent lying
to another agent, where both are explicitly modelled. For this external agent a truthful
announcement is the same as a true announcement, and a lying announcement is the same
as a false announcement.3 These matters will be addressed in detail.
In dynamic epistemic logics the transmission of messages is instantaneous and infallible.
This is another assumption in our modelling framework.
believes to be the truth, but that cannot be helped.
3This explains the terminological confusion in the area: the logic known as that of truthful public
announcements is really the logic of true public announcements.
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Lying about modal formulas The belief operators Ba do not merely apply to Boolean
propositions p but to any proposition ϕ with belief modalities. This is known as higher-
order belief. In the semantics, the generalization from ‘lying that p’ to ‘lying that ϕ’ for
any proposition, does not present any problem. This is, because it will be defined relative
to the set of states where the formula is believed by the speaker a. For a subset of the
domain, it does not matter if it was determined for a Boolean formula or for a modal
formula. Still, there are other problems.
Firstly, we aim for agents having what is known as ‘normal’ beliefs, that satisfy con-
sistency and introspection: Baϕ → ¬Ba¬ϕ, Baϕ → BaBaϕ, and ¬Baϕ → Ba¬Baϕ. If
we wish the addressee b to believe the lie that p even if he already believed ¬p, his beliefs
would become inconsistent. The property Baϕ → ¬Ba¬ϕ of consistent belief is therefore
not preserved under lying updates. We will address this.
Secondly, we may well require that Ba¬p is true before the lie by a that p and that
Ba¬p and Bbp are true after the lie that p, but we cannot and do not even want to require
for any ϕ that, if Ba¬ϕ is true before the lie by a that ϕ, then Ba¬ϕ and Bbϕ are true
afterwards. For a typical example, suppose that p is false and that a lies that p ∧¬Bbp to
b.4 We would say that the lie was successful if Bbp holds, not if Bb(p ∧ ¬Bbp) holds, an
inconsistency (for belief). Also, we do not want that Ba¬(p ∧¬Bbp), that was true before
the lie, remains true after the lie. It is common in the area to stick to the chosen semantic
operation but not to require persistence of belief in such cases.
Our proposed modelling, that also applies to modal formulas, allows us to elegantly
explain why in the consecutive number riddle we can have that (see above) ‘as a result
of Anne’s announcement Bill will learn Anne’s number, so that his prior announcement
“I know your number,” that was a lie at the time, now has become true.’ The seemingly
contradictory announcements in the riddle are Moorean phenomenona, and the added
aspect of uncertainty about lying or truthtelling makes the analysis more complex, and the
results more interesting.
More modalities In the concluding Section 9 we discuss further issues in the modal
logic of lying, such as group epistemic operators (common belief) in preconditions and
postconditions of lying, and structures with histories of actions to keep track of the number
of past lies.
1.2 A short history of lying
We conclude this introduction with an review of literature on lying.
Philosophy Lying has been a thriving topic in the philosophical community for a long,
long time [36, 11, 28, 29]. Almost any analysis starts with quoting Augustine on lying:
4It is not raining in Sevilla. You don’t know that. I am lying to you: “You don’t know that it is raining
in Sevilla!” I.e., using the conventional conversational implicature, “It is raining in Sevilla but/and you
do not know that.” This is a Moorean sentence.
6
“that man lies, who has one thing in his mind and utters another in words”
“the fault of him who lies, is the desire of deceiving in the uttering of his mind”
[5]
In other words: saying that p while believing that ¬p, with the intention to make believe p,
our starting assumption. The requirements for the belief preconditions and postconditions
in such works are illuminating [29]. For example, the addressee should not merely believe
the lie but believe it to be believed by the speaker. Indeed, ... and even believed to
be commonly believed, would the modal logician say (see the final Section 9). Scenarios
involving eavesdroppers (can you lie to an agent who is not the addressee?) are relevant
for logic and multi-agent system design, and also claims that you can only lie if you really
say something: an omission is not a lie [29]. Wrong, says the computer scientist: if the
protocol is common knowledge, you can lie by not acting when you should have; say, by
not stepping forward in the muddy children problem, although you know that you are
muddy. The philosophical literature also clearly distinguishes between false propositions
and propositions believed to be false but in fact true, so that when you lie about them, in
fact you tell the truth. Gettier-like scenarios are presented, including delayed justification
[34].5 Much is said on the morality of lying [11] and on its intentional aspect. As said, we
abstract from the intentional aspect of lying. We also abstract from its moral aspect.
Psychology Lying excites great interest in the general public. Lots of popular science
books are written on the topic, typical examples are [38, 41]. In psychology, biology, and
other experimental sciences lying and deception are related. A cuckoo is ‘lying’ if it is
laying eggs in another bird’s nest. Two issues are relevant for our investigation. Firstly,
that it is typical to be believed, and that lying is therefore the exception. We model
the ‘successful’ lie that is indeed believed, unless there is evidence to the contrary: prior
belief in the opposite. Secondly, that the detection of lying is costly, and that this is a
reason to be typically believed. In logic, cost is computational complexity. The issue of
the complexity of lying is shortly addressed in Section 9 on further research.
Economics In economics, ‘cheap talk’ is making false promises. Your talk is cheap
if you do not intend to execute an action that you publicly announced to plan. It is
therefore a lie, it is deception [18, 22]. Our focus is different. We do not model lying about
planned actions but lying about propositions, and in particular on their belief consequences.
Economists postulate probabilities for lying strategies and truthful strategies, to be tested
experimentally. We only distinguish lies that are always believed from lies that (in the face
of contradictory prior belief) are never believed.
Logic Papers that model lying as an epistemic action, inducing a transformation of an
epistemic model, include [6, 37, 8, 43, 24, 45]. Lying by an external observer has been dis-
cussed by Baltag and collaborators from the inception of dynamic epistemic logic onward
5Suppose that you believe that ¬p and that you lie that p. Later find out that your belief was mistaken
because p was really true. You can then with some justification say “Ah, so I was not really lying.”
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[6]; the later [8] also discusses lying in logics with plausible belief, as does [43]. In [45]
the conscious update in [17] is applied to model lying by an external observer. In [35] the
authors give a modal logic of lying and bluffing, including intentions. Instead of bluffing
they call this bullshit, after [16]. Strangely, in view of contradictory Moorean phenomena,
they do not model lying as a dynamic modality. In [37, 24] the unbelievable update is
considered; this is the issue consistency preservation for belief, as in our treatment of un-
believable lies (rejecting the lie that p if you already believe ¬p). The promising manuscript
[26] allows explicit reference in the logical language to truthful, lying and bluffing agents
(the authors call this ‘agent types’), thus enabling some form of self-reference.
Artificial intelligence? Various of the already cited works could have been put under
this header. But then it would not have been a question mark. Applications of epistemic
logic in artificial intelligence typically are about knowledge and not about belief. Successful
frameworks as interpreted systems and knowledge programs [15] model multi-S5 systems.
Our analysis of the modal dynamics of lying aims to prepare the ground for AI applications
involving belief instead of knowledge, and to facilitate determining the complexities of such
reasoning tasks.6
1.3 Contributions and overview
A main and novel contribution of our paper is a precise model of the informative con-
sequences of two agents lying to each other, and a logic for that, including a treatment
of bluffing. This agent-to-agent-lying, in the logic called agent announcement logic, is
presented in Section 4, with an extended example in Section 5. A special, simpler, case
is that of an outside observer who is lying to an agent that is modelled in the system.
This (truthful and lying) public announcement logic is treated in Section 3. That section
mainly contains results from [45]. Section 2 introduces the standard truthful (without
lying) public announcement logic of which our proposals can be seen as variations. Section
6 on action models is an alternative perspective on the frameworks presented in Section
3 and Section 4. It anchors them in another part of dynamic epistemic logic. Section 7
contains another novel contribution. It adapts the logics of the Sections 3 and 4 to the
requirement that unbelievable lies (if you hear p but already believe ¬p) should not be
incorporated. Subsequently, Section 8 adapts these logics to the requirement that unbe-
lievable lies, on the contrary, should be incorporated, but consistently so. This can be
anchored in yet another part of the dynamic epistemic logical literature, involving struc-
tures with plausibility relations. All these logics have complete axiomatizations (which
is unremarkable). An incidental novel contribution is how to resolve ambiguity between
bluffing and lying with disjunctive normal forms (Proposition 18). Section 9 finishes the
paper with considerations on the limitations of our approach and further research.
6Argumentation theory, when seen as an area in AI, does of course model beliefs and their justificiations.
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2 Truthful public announcements
The well-known logic of truthful public announcements [33, 7] is an extension of multi-
agent epistemic logic. Its language, structures, and semantics are as follows. Given are a
finite set of agents A and a countable set of propositional variables P .
Definition 1 The language of truthful public announcement logic is inductively defined as
L(!) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Baϕ | [!ϕ]ψ
where p ∈ P , and a ∈ A.7 Without the announcement operators we get the language L of
epistemic logic. ⊣
Other propositional connectives are defined by abbreviation. For Baϕ, read ‘agent a be-
lieves formula ϕ’. Agent variables are a, b, c, . . . . For [!ϕ]ψ, read ‘after truthful public
announcement of ϕ, formula ψ (is true)’. The dual operator for the necessity-type an-
nouncement operator is by abbreviation defined as 〈!ϕ〉ψ := ¬[!ϕ]¬ψ. If Ba¬ϕ we say that
ϕ is unbelievable and, consequently, if ¬Ba¬ϕ we say that ϕ is believable. This is also read
as ‘agent a considers it possible that ϕ’.
Definition 2 An epistemic model M = (S,R, V ) consists of a domain S of states (or
‘worlds’), an accessibility function R : A→ P(S×S), where each R(a), for which we write
Ra, is an accessibility relation, and a valuation V : P → P(S), where each V (p) represents
the set of states where p is true. For s ∈ S, (M, s) is an epistemic state. ⊣
An epistemic state is also known as a pointed Kripke model. We often omit the parentheses.
Four model classes will appear in this work. Without any restrictions we call the model
class K. The class of models where all accessibility relations are transitive and euclidean
is called K45, and if they are also serial it is called KD45. The class of models where
all accessibility relations are equivalence relations is S5. Class KD45 is said to have the
properties of belief, and S5 to have the properties of knowledge.
Definition 3 Assume an epistemic model M = (S,R, V ).
M, s |= p iff s ∈ Vp
M, s |= ¬ϕ iff M, s 6|= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ and M, s |= ψ
M, s |= Baϕ iff for all t ∈ S : Ra(s, t) implies M, t |= ϕ
M, s |= [!ϕ]ψ iff M, s |= ϕ implies M |ϕ, s |= ψ
where the model restriction M |ϕ = (S ′, R′, V ′) is defined as S ′ = {s′ ∈ S | M, s′ |= ϕ} (=
[[ϕ]]M ), R
′
a = Ra ∩ (S
′ × S ′) and V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ S ′. ⊣
A complete proof system for this logic for class S5 is presented in [33]. Trivial variations
are complete axiomatizations for the model classes K and K45. The interaction axiom
between announcement and belief is:
7Unlike in the introduction, p is a Boolean/propositional variable, and not any Boolean proposition.
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Definition 4
[!ϕ]Baψ ↔ ϕ→ Ba[!ϕ]ψ ⊣
The interaction between announcement and other operators we assume known [44]. It
changes predictably in the other logics we present. In the coming sections, we will only
vary the dynamic part of the logic, and focus on that completely.
For an example of the semantics of public announcement, consider a situation wherein
an agent b is uncertain about p, and receives the information that p. The initial uncertainty
requires a model consisting of two states, one where p is true and one where p is false. In
view of the continuation, we draw all accessibility relations. For convenience, a state has
been given the value of the atom true there as its name. The actual state is underlined.
¬p pbb b
!p
⇒ p b
In the actual state p is true, and from the actual state two states are accessible: that
p-state and the ¬p-state. Therefore, the agent does not believe p (as there is an accessible
¬p-state) and does not believe ¬p either (as there is an accessible p-state). She is uncertain
whether p. The announcement !p results in a restriction of the epistemic state to the p-
state (it is false in the other state). On the right, the agent believes that p. In the initial
epistemic state it is therefore true that p ∧ ¬(Bbp ∨ Bb¬p) ∧ [!p]Bbp. Note that both on
the left and on the right the accessibility relation is an equivalence relation. Indeed, the
class S5 is closed under truthful public announcements. The example models change of
knowledge rather than the weaker change of belief.
The class KD45 is not closed under truthful public announcements. Let us consider
another example. Suppose agent a incorrectly believes p and wishes to process the truthful
public announcement that ¬p.
¬p pa a
!¬p
⇒ ¬p
On the left, we have that ¬p∧Bap is true. The new information !¬p results in eliminating
the p-state, and consequently agent a’s accessibility relation becomes empty. She believes
everything. The model on the left is KD45, but the model on the right is not KD45, it is
not serial. However, the class K45 is closed under truthful public announcements.
3 Logic of truthful and lying public announcements
The logic of lying public announcements complements the logic of truthful public an-
nouncements. They are inseparably tied to one another. For a clear link we need to use an
alternative semantics for truthful public announcement logic. The results in this section
are mainly from [45].
10
We expand the language of truthful public announcement logic with another inductive
construct [¡ϕ]ψ, for ‘after lying public announcement of ϕ, formula ψ (is true)’; in short
‘after the lie that ϕ, ψ’. This is the language L(!, ¡).
Definition 5 (Language)
L(!, ¡) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Baϕ | [!ϕ]ψ | [¡ϕ]ψ ⊣
Truthful public announcement logic is the logic to model the revelations of a benevolent
god, taken as the truth without questioning. The announcing agent is not modelled in
public announcement logic, but only the effect of its announcements on the audience, the
set of all agents. Consider a false public announcement, made by a malevolent entity, the
devil. Everything he says is false. Everything is a lie. As in religion, god and the devil are
inseparable and should be modelled simultaneously.
As a semantics for this logic we employ an alternative to the semantics for public an-
nouncement logic from the previous section. This alternative is the semantics of conscious
updates [17].8 When announcing ϕ, instead of eliminating states where ϕ does not hold,
one eliminates for each agent those pairs of its accessibility relation where ϕ does not hold
in the second argument of the pair. The effect of the announcement of ϕ is that only
states where ϕ is true are accessible for the agents. In other words, the semantics is arrow
eliminating instead of state eliminating. We call this the believed public announcement.
New information is accepted by the agents independent from the truth of that information.
Definition 6 (Semantics of believed public announcement)
M, s |= [believed public announcement that ϕ]ψ iff Mϕ, s |= ψ
where epistemic model Mϕ is as M except that (with S the domain of M)
Rϕa := Ra ∩ (S × [[ϕ]]M ). ⊣
In [45], the believed public announcement of ϕ is called manipulative update with ϕ. The
original proposal there is to view believed public announcement of ϕ as non-deterministic
choice (as in action logics and PDL-style logics) between truthful public announcement of
ϕ and lying public announcement of ϕ.
Definition 7 (Semantics of truthful and lying public announcement)
M, s |= [!ϕ]ψ iff M, s |= ϕ implies Mϕ, s |= ψ
M, s |= [¡ϕ]ψ iff M, s |= ¬ϕ implies Mϕ, s |= ψ ⊣
8A public announcement of ϕ is a conscious update with the test ?ϕ for the entire set of agents A
(such updates can be for any subset of agents). In [17] these updates are interpreted on non-wellfounded
sets, namely on rooted infinite trees, such as the tree unwinding of a pointed S5 model. We present the
simpler semantics for conscious update of [23]. We note that [17] and [33] were independent proposals for
the semantics of public announcements.
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If we now define [!ϕ¡]ψ by abbreviation as [!ϕ]ψ ∧ [¡ϕ]ψ, then !ϕ¡ has the semantics of
‘believed public announcement that ϕ’. The non-determinism of this operator (it has two
executions, one when ϕ is true and one when ϕ is false) comes to the fore if we write it in
the dual form: 〈!ϕ¡〉ψ ↔ 〈!ϕ〉ψ ∨ 〈¡ϕ〉ψ; in other words, we can view !ϕ¡ as some !ϕ ∪ ¡ϕ,
where ∪ is non-deterministic choice.
The following result justifies that it is not ambiguous to write !ϕ for ‘arrow elimination’
truthful public announcement but also for ‘state elimination’ truthful public announcement.
Proposition 8 ([23, 45]) Let s ∈ D(M) and M, s |= ϕ. Then
(Mϕ, s)↔(M |ϕ, s). ⊣
The symbol ↔ stands for ‘is bisimilar to’, a well-known notion that guarantees that the
models cannot be distinguished in the logical language [10].
State elimination seems simpler than arrow elimination. Having gone through the
trouble of reinterpreting truthful public announcement in arrow elimination semantics,
why did we not proceed in the other direction and reinterpret lying public announcement
in state elimination semantics? This is not possible! Consider a model wherein all belief
is correct, i.e., a model with equivalence relations encoding the beliefs of the agents. A
state elimination semantics preserves equivalence, whereas lying inevitably introduces false
beliefs: states not accessible to themselves.
The axiom for belief after truthful public announcement remains what it was (Definition
4, and using Proposition 8) and the axiom for the reduction of belief after lying is as follows.
Definition 9 (Axiom for belief after lying [45])
[¡ϕ]Baψ ↔ ¬ϕ→ Ba[!ϕ]ψ. ⊣
After the lying public announcement that ϕ, agent a believes that ψ, if and only if, on
condition that ϕ is false, agent a believes that ψ after truthful public announcement that
ϕ. To the credulous person who believes the lie, the lie appears to be the truth.
Proposition 10 ([45]) The axiomatization of the logic of truthful and lying public an-
nouncements is complete (for the model class K and for the model class K45). ⊣
Proof As for the logic of truthful public announcements, completeness is shown by a
reduction argument. All formulas in L(!, ¡) are equivalent to formulas in L (epistemic
logic). By means of equivalences such as in the axiom for belief after lying one can rewrite
each formula to an equivalent one without announcement operators. (As the class K45 is
not closed under updates with announcements, the logic is not complete for that class.) 
For an example, we show the effect of truthful and lying announcement of p to an agent b
in the model with uncertainty about p. The actual state must be different in these models:
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when lying that p, p is in fact false, whereas when truthfully announcing that p, p is in
fact true. For lying we get
¬p pbb b
¡p
⇒ ¬p pb b
whereas for truthtelling we get
¬p pbb b
!p
⇒ ¬p pb b
The reduction principle in [17, 23] for the interaction between belief and believed an-
nouncement is, in terms of our language, [!ϕ¡]Baϕ↔ Ba(ϕ→ [!ϕ¡]ψ). This seems to have
a different shape, as the modal operator binds the entire implication. But it is indeed valid
in our semantics (a technical detail we did not find elsewhere).
Proposition 11 |= [!ϕ¡]Baϕ↔ Ba(ϕ→ [!ϕ¡]ψ) ⊣
Proof
[!ϕ¡]Baψ ⇔ [!ϕ]Baψ ∧ [¡ϕ]Baψ
⇔♯ (ϕ→ Ba[!ϕ]ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ→ Ba[!ϕ]ψ)
⇔ Ba[!ϕ]ψ
⇔ Ba(ϕ→ [!ϕ]ψ)
⇔∗ Ba((ϕ→ [!ϕ]ψ) ∧ (ϕ→ [¡ϕ]ψ))
⇔ Ba(ϕ→ ([!ϕ]ψ ∧ [¡ϕ]ψ))
⇔ Ba(ϕ→ [!ϕ¡]ψ)
The ♯-ed equivalence holds because from the semantics of truthful and lying announcement
directly follows that [!ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ [!ϕ]ψ) and [¡ϕ]ψ ↔ (¬ϕ→ [¡ϕ]ψ). The *-ed equivalence
holds because
ϕ→ [¡ϕ]ψ ⇔ ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ [¡ϕ]ψ)
⇔ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ [¡ϕ]ψ
⇔ ⊥→ [¡ϕ]ψ
⇔ ⊤

The logic of truthful and lying public announcement satisfies the property ‘substitution
of equivalents’, which we have used repeatedly in the proof of Proposition 11, but the
logic does not satisfy the property ‘substitution of variables’ (substitution of formulas
for propositional variables preserves validity). For example, [!p]p is valid but, clearly,
[!(p ∧ ¬Bap)](p ∧ ¬Bap) is invalid.
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4 Agent announcement logic
In the logic of lying and truthful public announcements, the announcing agent is an outside
observer and is implicit. Therefore, it is also implicit that it believes that the announcement
is false or true. In multi-agent epistemic logic, it is common to formalize ‘agent a truthfully
announces ϕ’ as ‘the outside observer truthfully announces Baϕ’. However, ‘agent a lies
that ϕ’ cannot be modelled as ‘the outside observer lies that Baϕ’. This is the main reason
for a logic of lying.
For a counterexample, consider an epistemic state with equivalence relations, modelling
knowledge, where b does not know whether p, a knows whether p, and p is true. Agent
a is in the position to tell b the truth about p. A truthful public announcement of Bap
(arrow elimination semantics, Definition 7) indeed simulates that a truthfully and publicly
announces p.
¬p pbb ba a
!p
⇒ ¬p pb b a
Given the same model, now suppose p is false, and that a lies that p. A lying public
announcement of Bap (it satisfies the required precondition ¬Bap) does not result in the
desired information state, because this makes agent a believe her own lie. In fact, as she
already knew ¬p, this makes a’s beliefs inconsistent.
¬p pbb ba a
¡p
⇒ ¬p pb b a
Instead, a lie by a to b that p should have the following effect:
¬p pbb ba a
¡ap⇒ ¬p pb ba a
After this lie we have that a still believes that ¬p, but that b believes that p. (We even
have that b believes that b and a have common belief of p, see Section 9.) We satisfied the
requirements of a lying agent announcement, for believed lies.
The precondition for agent a truthtelling that ϕ is Baϕ and the precondition for agent
a lying that p is Ba¬ϕ. Another form of announcement is bluffing. You are bluffing that
ϕ, if you say that ϕ but are uncertain whether ϕ. The precondition for agent a bluffing is
therefore ¬(Baϕ∨Ba¬ϕ). If belief is implicit, we had only two preconditions for announcing
ϕ: ϕ and ¬ϕ, for truthtelling and lying. The ‘third’ would be ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) which is ⊥. The
devil can lie, but it cannot bluff.
The postconditions of these three types of announcement are a function of their effect on
the accessibility relation of the agents. The effect is the same for all three types. However,
it is different for the speaker and for the addressee(s).
• States where ϕ was believed by speaker a remain accessible to speaker a;
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• States where ϕ was not believed by speaker a remain accessible to speaker a;
• States where ϕ was believed by speaker a remain accessible to addressee b;
• States where ϕ was not believed by speaker a are no longer accessible to addressee b.
These requirements are embodied by the following syntax and semantics.
Definition 12 The language of agent announcement logic is defined as
L(!a, ¡a, ¡!a) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Baϕ | [!aϕ]ψ | [¡aϕ]ψ | [¡!aϕ]ψ ⊣
The inductive constructs [!aϕ]ψ,[¡aϕ]ψ, and [¡!aϕ]ψ stand for, respectively, a truthfully
announces ϕ, a is lying that ϕ, and a is bluffing that ϕ; where agent a addresses all other
agents b.
Definition 13
M, s |= [!aϕ]ψ iff M, s |= Baϕ implies M
ϕ
a , s |= ψ
M, s |= [¡aϕ]ψ iff M, s |= Ba¬ϕ implies M
ϕ
a , s |= ψ
M, s |= [¡!aϕ]ψ iff M, s |= ¬(Baϕ ∨ Ba¬ϕ) implies M
ϕ
a , s |= ψ
where Mϕa is as M except for the accessibility relation R
′ defined as (S is the domain of
M , and a 6= b)
R′a := Ra
R′b := Rb ∩ (S × [[Baϕ]]M). ⊣
The principles for a truthtelling, lying, or bluffing to b are as follows. The belief con-
sequences for the speaker are different from the belief consequences for the addressee(s).
Definition 14 (Axioms for the belief consequences of announcements)
[!aϕ]Bbψ ↔ Baϕ→ Bb[!aϕ]ψ
[!aϕ]Baψ ↔ Baϕ→ Ba[!aϕ]ψ
[¡aϕ]Bbψ ↔ Ba¬ϕ→ Bb[!aϕ]ψ
[¡aϕ]Baψ ↔ Ba¬ϕ→ Ba[¡aϕ]ψ
[¡!aϕ]Bbψ ↔ ¬(Baϕ ∨Ba¬ϕ)→ Bb[!aϕ]ψ
[¡!aϕ]Baψ ↔ ¬(Baϕ ∨Ba¬ϕ)→ Ba[¡!aϕ]ψ
In other words, the liar knows that he is lying, but the dupe he is lying to, believes that the
liar is telling the truth. The principles for truthtelling and bluffing are similar to that for
lying, but with the obvious different conditions on the right hand side of the equivalences.
The bluffer knows that he is bluffing, but the dupe he is bluffing to, believes that the bluffer
is telling the truth. And in case the announcing agent is truthful, there is no discrepancy,
both the speaker and the addressee believe that the consequences are those of truthtelling.
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Proposition 15 The axiomatization of the logic of agent announcements is complete. ⊣
Proof Just as in the previous logics (see Proposition 10) completeness is shown by a
reduction argument. All formulas in L(!a, ¡a, ¡!a) are equivalent to formulas in epistemic
logic. In the axioms above, the announcement operator is (on the right) always pushed
further down into any given formula. As before, the result holds for model classes K, K45
and S5, but not for KD45.
An alternative, indirect, completeness proof is that agent announcement logic is action
model logic for a given action model, as will be explained in Section 6. 
As an example illustrating the difference between a truthtelling, lying and bluffing agent
announcement we present the following model wherein the adressee b, hearing the an-
nouncement of p by agent a, considers all three possible. In fact, a is bluffing, and a’s
announcement that p is false. After the announcement, b incorrectly believes that p, but
a is still uncertain whether p. If the bottom-left state had been the actual state, a would
have been lying that p, and if the bottom-right state had been the actual state, it would
have been a truthful announcement by a that p.
¬p p
¬p p
b
a
b
b b
bb
b ba a
b ba a
¡!ap
⇒
¬p p
¬p p
b
bb
a
b
b
ba a
ba a
Unbelievable announcements The axiomatization of the logic of agent announce-
ments is incomplete for KD45 (see the proof of Proposition 15) because of the problem
of unbelievable announcements. In Sections 7 and 8 we present alternative logics wherein
believable announcements (announcements of ϕ to addressee b such that ¬Bb¬ϕ is true)
are treated differently from unbelievable announcements (such that Bb¬ϕ is true). These
logics are complete for class KD45.
Outside observer Consider a depiction of an epistemic model. The outside observer is
the guy or girl looking at the picture: you, the reader. She can see all different states.
She has no uncertainty and her beliefs are correct. It is therefore that her truthful an-
nouncements are true and that her lying announcements are false. It is also therefore that
‘truthful public announcement logic’ is not a misnomer, it is indeed the logic of how to
process new information that is true.
We can model the outside observer as an agent gd, for ‘god or the devil’. (The model
does not need to be a bisimulation contraction.)
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Proposition 16 Given an epistemic modelM , let gd ∈ A be an agent with an accessibility
relation that is the identity on M . Then Mϕgd = M
ϕ. Let ϕ, ψ not contain announcement
operators, then [!gdϕ]ψ is equivalent to [!ϕ]ψ, and [¡gdϕ]ψ is equivalent to [¡ϕ]ψ. ⊣
Proof In Definition 13, the accessibility of the addressees is adjusted to R′b := Rb ∩ (S ×
[[Bgdϕ]]M ). As Rgd is the identity, Bgdϕ is equivalent to ϕ. So, R
′
b := Rb ∩ (S × [[ϕ]]M ), as
in Definition 6. 
Lying about beliefs Agents may announce factual propositions (Boolean formulas) but
also modal propositions, and thus be lying and bluffing about them. In the consecutive
numbers riddle the announcements ‘I know your number’ and ‘I do not know your number’
are modal propositions, and the agents may be lying about those.9 (Details in Section 5.)
For our target agents, that satisfy introspection (so that BaBaϕ↔ Baϕ and Ba¬Baϕ↔
¬Baϕ are validities), the distinction between bluffing and lying seems to become blurred.
If I am uncertain whether p, I would be bluffing if I told you that p, but I would be lying
if I told you that I believe that p. The announcement that p satisfies the precondition
¬(Bap ∨ Ba¬p). It is bluffing that p (it is ¡!ap). But the announcement that Bap satisfies
the precondition Ba¬Bap, the negation of the announcement. It is lying that Bap (it is
¡aBap). (Proof: ¬(Bap ∨Ba¬p) is equivalent to ¬Bap ∧ ¬Ba¬p, from which follows ¬Bap,
and with negative introspection Ba¬Bap.) We would prefer to call both bluffing, and ‘a
announces that Bap’ strictly or really ‘a announces that p’. A general solution to avoid
such ambiguity involves more than merely stripping a formula of an outer Ba operator:
a announcing that BaBap should also strictly be a announcing that p, and a announcing
that Bap∧Baq should strictly be a announcing that that p∧ q. We need recursion. In the
following definition and proposition we assume an agent with consistent beliefs.
Definition 17 (Strictly lying) An announcement by a that ϕ is strict iff ϕ is equivalent
to ⊤ or ϕ is equivalent to
∨
i ψ
a
i ∧
∧
i ¬Ba¬ψ
a
i where all ψ
a
i are alternating disjunctive forms
(see proof below) for agents other than a. An agent announcement ¡aϕ is strictly lying iff
there is a ϕ′ equivalent to ϕ such that ϕ′ is strict and ¡aϕ
′ is a lying agent announcement.
(Similarly for strictly bluffing.) ⊣
Proposition 18 For each ϕ ∈ L(!a, ¡a, ¡!a) there is an equivalent ψ ∈ L that is strict. ⊣
9In social interaction, untruthfully announcing epistemic propositions is not always considered lying
with the negative moral connotation. Suppose we work in the same department and one of our colleagues,
X , is having a divorce. I know this. I also know that you know this. But we have not discussed the matter
between us. I can bring up the matter in conversation by saying ‘You know that X is having a divorce!’.
But this is unwise. You may not be willing to admit your knowledge, because X ’s husband is your friend,
which I have no reason to know; etc. A better strategy for me is to say ‘You may not know that X is
having a divorce’. This is a lie. I do not consider it possible that you do not know that. But, unless we
are very good friends, you will not laugh in my face to that and respond with ‘Liar!’. Could it be that
lies about facts are typically considered worse than lies about epistemic propositions, and that the more
modalities you stack in your lying announcement, the more innocent the lie becomes?
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Proof We first define the alternating disjunctive form (adf). An adf is a disjunction of
formulas of shape ψ0 ∧
∧
b∈A′(Bb
∨
i ψ
b
i ∧
∧
i ¬Bb¬ψ
b
i ), where ψ0 ∈ L, A
′ ⊆ A, and where
ψbi is an adf for a group A
′′ ⊂ A of agents other than b (the ‘alternating’ in alternating
disjunctive forms). The indices i range over 1, . . . , n (n ≥ 1). We may assume that for
each b some ψbi is non-trivial (i.e., not equivalent to ⊤), because otherwise we can take
A′ \ b in the conjunction above. Each formula in multi-agent KD45 is equivalent to an adf
[20].10
Now for the proof. Let ϕ ∈ L(!a, ¡a, ¡!a). Determine an equivalent ϕ
′ ∈ L (i.e., rewrite ϕ
into a multi-agent epistemic formula, without announcement operators). Let ψ be an adf
equivalent to Baϕ
′. It is elementary to see that ψ must be either equivalent to ⊤ or have
the form Ba
∨
i ψ
a
i ∧
∧
i ¬Ba¬ψ
a
i and where some ψ
a
i is non-trivial. We now observe that
ψ ⇔ Ba
∨
i ψ
a
i ∧
∧
i ¬Ba¬ψ
a
i
⇔ Ba
∨
i ψ
a
i ∧
∧
iBa¬Ba¬ψ
a
i )
⇔ Ba(
∨
i ψ
a
i ∧
∧
i ¬Ba¬ψ
a
i )
and that
∨
i ψ
a
i ∧
∧
i ¬Ba¬ψ
a
i is strict. 
Mistakes and lies There are two sorts of mistaken beliefs.
The first kind is when I believe p → ¬q and I believe p, and, when questioned about
my belief in q, confidently state that I belief that q. This is a mistaken belief. The formula
Baq should be false, because Ba¬q is a deductive consequence of Ba(p→ ¬q) and Bap. To
explain this sort of mistaken belief we need to resort to bounded rationality. We do not
do that.
The second kind of mistaken belief is when I believe that p but when in fact p is false.
Fully rational agents can make such mistakes. This, we can address. It amounts to the
truth of ¬p ∧ Bap.
What is the difference between a lie and a mistake? I am lying if I say ϕ and believe
¬ϕ (independently from the truth of ϕ), whereas I am mistaken if I say ϕ and believe ϕ,
but ϕ is false. Let a be the speaker, then the precondition of lying that ϕ is Ba¬ϕ and the
precondition of a mistaken truthful announcement that ϕ is ¬ϕ ∧ Baϕ. The speaker can
therefore distinguish a lie from a mistake.
How about the addressee? Clearly, aKD45 agent cannot distinguish another agent lying
from being mistaken, because it can itself be mistaken about the announced proposition
and about the speaker’s beliefs of that proposition. We can then only observe that if a
says ϕ given that Bb(¬ϕ∧Baϕ), then b believes a to be mistaken, whereas if a says ϕ given
that BbBa¬ϕ), then b believes a to be lying.
But if both knowledge and belief play a role then the addressee can distinguish a lie
from a mistake. A standard assumption in many games (therefore called ‘fair games’)
10Reported in [20], an adf is a multi-agent generalization of the (single-agent) disjunctive form as in [30,
p.35] (where it is called S5 normal form), and a special case of the disjunctive form as in [14]. An adf
contains no stacks of Ba operators without an intermediary Bb operator for another agent, i.e., if Baχ is a
subformula of an adf and Baχ
′′ is a subformula of χ then there is an agent b 6= a and a χ′ such that Bbχ
′
is a subformula of χ and Baχ
′′ is a subformula of χ′.
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and in many other distributed systems, is initial common knowledge of all agents of the
uncertainty about the system. (I know — I can assume to know — that you do not know
my card. If not, it’s not fair, it was cheating.) Part of that initial common knowledge is
of facts or otherwise positive formulas, persisting after every update. In such a system,
beliefs that are not knowledge can only be induced by incorrect updates (lies). For such
an addresssee, a mistake is that a says ϕ when Kb(¬ϕ ∧Baϕ), whereas a lie is that a says
ϕ when KbKa¬ϕ. The consecutive numbers riddle gives an example of such a lie and such
a mistake.
5 Lying in the consecutive numbers riddle
In this section we give an extended example of agent announcement logic. We recall the
consecutive numbers riddle.
Anne and Bill are each going to be told a natural number. Their numbers will
be one apart. The numbers are now being whispered in their respective ears.
They are aware of this scenario. Suppose Anne is told 2 and Bill is told 3.
The following truthful conversation between Anne and Bill now takes place:
• Anne: “I do not know your number.”
• Bill: “I do not know your number.”
• Anne: “I know your number.”
• Bill: “I know your number.”
Explain why is this possible.
We first analyze the riddle in public announcement logic with the state elimination seman-
tics. Although the riddle goes back to 1953 [25], this analysis dates from 1984 [46] and
played an important role in the development of the area of dynamic epistemic logic.11 The
initial model encodes that the numbers are consecutive and consists of two disconnected
countable parts, one where the agents have common knowledge (correct common belief)
that a’s number is odd and b’s number is even, and another one where the agents have
common knowledge that a’s number is even and b’s number is odd. As before, the actual
state is underlined. This is the state (2, 3), where a is told 2 and b is told 3. In this
simplified visualization we use the convention that symmetry and reflexivity are assumed.
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .
(1,0) (1,2) (3,2) (3,4) . . .
b a b
a b a
11In [46] the consecutive numbers riddle is called the Conway Paradox, after [13]. That name that has
since stuck. Conway (and Paterson) indeed present an epistemic riddle in [13], but not the consecutive
numbers riddle. This was a mistaken attribution, as Peter van Emde Boas (an author of [46]) told us.
19
To determine the model restriction for an announcement, given a number pair (m,n) let
ma stand for ‘Anne is told numberm’ and let nb stand for ‘Bill is told number n’. Each state
corresponds to a number pair (m,n). To process Anne’s first announcement we determine
if ¬Banb in that state. If so, the state is kept. Otherwise, the state is eliminated. For
Bill’s subsequent announcement we do this for ¬Bbma. Etc.: the third time for Banb, and
the last time for Bbma.
12 We successively process all four announcements. The epistemic
state resulting from an announcement is shown immediately after it.
• Anne: “I do not know your number.”
(2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .
(1,0) (1,2) (3,2) (3,4) . . .
a b
a b a
• Bill: “I do not know your number.”
(2,3) (4,3) . . .
(1,2) (3,2) (3,4) . . .
b
b a
• Anne: “I know your number.”
(2,3)
(1,2)
• Bill: “I know your number.”
The last announcement does not make a difference anymore, as it is already common
knowledge that Anne and Bill know each other’s number.
Consecutive numbers with lying Next, we show two different scenarios for the con-
secutive numbers riddle with lying. This is agent truthtelling and agent lying, the epistemic
actions defined as !aϕ and ¡aϕ (Definition 12). With lying, the riddle involves (the speaker)
feigning knowledge and (the addressee) incorrectly believing something to be knowledge,
so we move from knowledge to belief. In the communication only occur ‘I know your
number’ and ‘I do not know your number’. Bluffing can therefore not be demonstrated:
introspective agents believe their uncertainty and believe their beliefs. As we are reasoning
from the actual state (2, 3), to simplify matters we do not depict the disconnected upper
part of the model. And as beliefs may be incorrect, we show all arrows.
12Although the riddle is a standard illustration of truthful public announcement logic, these announce-
ments cannot actually be formalized in the language of that logic. For the first announcement it would be
the infinitary expression
∧
n∈N(nb → ¬Banb) (the expression holds for all n 6= 1). This is not a formula in
L(!). To demonstrate a and b lying to each other this does not matter.
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First scenario The first scenario consists of Anne lying in her first announcement. Bill
does not believe Anne’s announcement: his accessibility relation has become empty. Bill’s
beliefs are therefore no longer consistent. Here, the analysis stops. We do not treat Bill’s
‘announcement’ “That’s a lie” as a permitted move in the game. On the assumption of
initial common knowledge Bill knows that Anne was lying and not mistaken.
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a b
ab ab ab ab
• Anne: “I know your number.” Anne is lying
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a
ab a a a
• Bill: “That’s a lie.”
Second scenario In the second scenario Anne initially tells the truth, after which Bill
is lying, resulting in Anne mistakenly concluding (and announcing) that she knows Bill’s
number: she believes it to be 1. This mistaken announcement by Anne is informative to
Bill. He learns from it (correctly) that Anne’s number is 2, something he didn’t know
before.
In the second scenario, Bill gets away with lying, because Anne considered it possible
that he told the truth. Bill knows (believes correctly, and justifiably) that Anne’s second
announcement was a mistake and not a lie. The justification is, again, common knowledge
in the initial epistemic state.
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a b
ab ab ab ab
• Anne: “I do not know your number.”
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a b
a ab ab ab
• Bill: “I know your number.” Bill is lying
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a b
a ab b b
• Anne: “I know your number.” Anne is mistaken.
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(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a b
a ab b
Once the agents consider it possible that the other is lying, every announcement can
be either truthful or lying. This is obvious, because (just as for the semantics of ‘believed
public announcement’) the structural transformation induced by agent announcement de-
pends on the model only, and not the actual state. The two scenarios can therefore be
executed in any given state of the epistemic model. Whether the announcements are lying
or truthtelling depends on the actual state (only).
For example, in the first scenario, if the initial state had been (4, 3), it would also have
been a lie, and Bill would have similarly detected the lie. If the initial state had been (2, 1),
it would still have been a lie, but Bill would not have known that. And if the initial state
had been (0, 1), it would have been the truth. Similar variations can be outlined for the
second scenario.
Instead of considering Bill’s “That’s a lie” as terminating the game by observing an
illegal move (breach of protocol), we could consider modelling this as an informative (agent)
announcement. It amounts to Bill announcing ⊥, i.e., as the truthful agent announcement
!Bb⊥ (‘I believe a false statement’). In (2, 3), the formula Bb⊥ is true. In a state where
Bill’s beliefs are consistent, it is false. The informative consequences are as follows.
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a
ab a a a
• Bill: “That’s a lie.”
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a
b a a
Of course, this way we declare it a permitted move in the consecutive numbers game,
and Bill could have lied in his announcement! Consider actual number pair (0, 1). Anne
truthfully announces “I know your number.” Following Bill’s response “That’s a lie”, Anne
will now even more indignantly contest: “That cannot be, you are lying!”, i.e., “Your
announcement “That’s a lie” was a lie.” We recall that given initial common knowledge
Anne knows that Bill is in fact lying. There is no uncertainty. Lying games may benefit
from analysis in game theory, by associating a high negative payoff to the discovery of
lying, see Section 9.
6 Action models and lying
Whether I am truthfully announcing ϕ to you, or am lying that ϕ, or am bluffing that ϕ,
to you it all appears as the same annoucement ϕ!. Whereas to me, the speaker, they all
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appear to be different announcements: I know whether I am truthful, lying, or bluffing.
Different agents have different perspectives on this action. Action models [7] are a familiar
way to formalize uncertainty about actions in that form of different perspectives on ‘what
the real action is’. The action model for truthful public announcement (state elimination
semantics) can be viewed as a singleton action model. This is well-known. We can view
truthful and lying public announcement (‘believed announcement’, the arrow elimination
semantics) as the different points, respectively, of a two-point action model. This is some-
what less well-known. (The modelling of believed announcements [17] as an action model
was suggested in [39, 23].) We can also view truthful, lying and bluffing agent announce-
ment as the respective different points of a three-point action model. These should be seen
as alternative descriptions of the logics of lying in terms of a well-known framework. It
has the additional advantage of independently validating the various axioms for lying and
bluffing, and providing alternative completeness proofs (action model logic is complete).
All the following definitions can be found in any standard introduction to action models,
such as [44].
An action model is a structure like a Kripke model but with a precondition function
instead of a valuation function.
Definition 19 (Action model) An action model M = (S,R, pre) consists of a domain S
of actions, an accessibility function R : A → P(S × S), where each Ra is an accessibility
relation, and a precondition function pre : S → LX , where LX is a logical language. A
pointed action model is an epistemic action. ⊣
A truthful public announcement of ϕ (state elimination semantics) is a singleton action
model with precondition ϕ and with the single action accessible to all agents.
Performing an epistemic action in an epistemic state means computing their restricted
modal product. This product encodes the new state of information.
Definition 20 (Update of an epistemic state with an action model) Given an epis-
temic state (M, s) where M = (S,R, V ) and an epistemic action (M, s) where M =
(S,R, pre). Let M, s |= pre(s). The update (M ⊗ M, (s, s)) is an epistemic state where
M ⊗M = (S ′, R′, V ′) such that
S ′ = {(t, t) |M, t |= pre(t)}
((t, t), (t′, t′)) ∈ R′a iff (t, t
′) ∈ Ra and (t, t
′) ∈ Ra
(t, t) ∈ V ′(p) iff t ∈ V (p) ⊣
The domain of M ⊗ M is the product of the domains of M and M, but restricted to
state/action pairs (t, t) such that M, t |= pre(t), i.e., such that the action can be executed
in that state. (Note that a state in the resulting domain is no longer an abstract object,
as before, but such a state/action-pair.) An agent considers a pair (t, t) possible in the
next information state if she considered the previous state t possible, and the execution of
action t in that state. And the valuations do not change after action execution.
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Definition 21 (Action model for truthful and lying pub. ann.) The action model
M′ for truthful and lying public announcement that ϕ, where ϕ ∈ L(!, ¡), consists of two
actions (suggestively) named ! and ¡, with pre(!) = ϕ and pre(¡) = ¬ϕ, and such that for
all agents only action ! is accessible. Truthful public announcement of ϕ is the epistemic
action (M′, !). Lying public announcement of ϕ is the epistemic action (M′, ¡). The action
model can be depicted as follows. Preconditions are shown below the actions.
¡ !
¬ϕ ϕ
a a
⊣
This terminology is not ambiguous in view of our earlier results, as we have the following.
Proposition 22 ([39, 23])
M, s |= [!ϕ]ψ iff M ⊗M′, (s, !) |= ψ
M, s |= [¡ϕ]ψ iff M ⊗M′, (s, ¡) |= ψ . ⊣
Proof Elementary, by induction on ψ. 
For an example, we show the execution of (M′, ¡) for ‘the outside observer is lying to
a that p’, in the epistemic state where the agent a is uncertain whether p but where p is
false.
¬p paa a × ¡ !a a ⇒ (¬p, ¡) (p, !)a a
Consider this epistemic model (S,R, V ). As before, the states in the epistemic model
are named after their valuation, so that S = {¬p, p}; the state named ¬p is simply the
state where p is false, etc. The modal product (S ′, R′, V ′) consists of two states; (¬p, ¡) ∈
S ′ because M,¬p |= pre(¡), as pre(¡) = ¬p, and (p, !) ∈ S ′ because M, p |= p. Then,
((¬p, ¡), (p, !)) ∈ R′a because (¬p, p) ∈ Ra (in M) and (¡, !) ∈ Ra (in the action model M
′),
etc. It is an artifact of the example that the shape of the action model is the shape of the
next epistemic state. That is merely a consequence of the fact that the initial epistemic
state has the universal accessibility relation for the agent on a domain of all valuations
of the atoms occurring in the precondition (here: a domain of two states, for the two
valuations of p).
Possibly more elegantly, we can also show the correspondence established in Proposition
22 from the perspective of a different logic. With an epistemic action (M, s) we can associate
a dynamic modal operator [M, s] in a logical language where an enumeration of action
model frames is a parameter of the inductive language definition, apart from propositional
variables P and agents A.
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Definition 23 (Language of action model logic)
L(⊗) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Baϕ | [M, s]ψ ⊣
The last clause is in fact inductive, if we realize that the preconditions of all actions in M,
including s, are also of type formula. For example, truthful public announcement logic is
an instantiation of that language for the singleton set of actions {!}, where we view ‘!’ as an
operation with two input formulae ϕ and ψ and that returns as output the announcement
formula [!ϕ]ψ.
Definition 24 (Semantics of [M, s])
M, s |= [M, s]ψ iff M, s |= pre(s) implies M ⊗M, (s, s) |= ψ ⊣
Given the action model for truthful and lying public announcement that ϕ of Definition
21, but with ϕ ∈ L(⊗), and given an inductively defined translation tr : L(⊗) → L(!, ¡)
with only nontrivial clauses tr([M′, !]ψ) := [!tr(ϕ)]tr(ψ) and tr([M′, ¡]ψ) := [¡tr(ϕ)]tr(ψ),
the correspondence established in Proposition 22 can be viewed from the perspective of
the dynamic modal operators for action models (where we suggestively execute the first
step of the translation).
M, s |= [!tr(ϕ)]tr(ψ) iff M, s |= [M′, !]ψ
M, s |= [¡tr(ϕ)]tr(ψ) iff M, s |= [M′, ¡]ψ
We now proceed with the presentation of action models for agent announcements.
Definition 25 (Action model for agent announcement) The action model M′′ for
agent announcement consists of three actions named ¡!a, !a, and ¡a with preconditions
¬(Baϕ ∨ Ba¬ϕ), Baϕ, and Ba¬ϕ, respectively, where ϕ ∈ L(!a, ¡a, ¡!a). The announcing
agent a has identity access on the action model. To the other agents b only action !a is
accessible. Agent a truthfully announcing ϕ to all other b is is the epistemic action (M′′, !a)
— with precondition Baϕ, therefore — and similarly lying and bluffing are the action
models (M′′, ¡a) and (M
′′, ¡!a).
¡!a !a ¡a
¬(Baϕ ∨ Ba¬ϕ) Baϕ Ba¬ϕ
b b
a ab a
⊣
Again, we have the desired correspondence (and this can, again, be formulated in action
model logic with an inductive translation).
Proposition 26
M, s |= [!aϕ]ψ iff M ⊗M
′′, (s, !a) |= ψ
M, s |= [¡aϕ]ψ iff M ⊗M
′′, (s, ¡a) |= ψ
M, s |= [¡!aϕ]ψ iff M ⊗M
′′, (s, ¡!a) |= ψ ⊣
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The action model representations validate the axioms for announcement and belief, for all
versions shown; and they justify that these axioms form part of complete axiomatizations.
These axioms are instantiations of the more general axiom for an epistemic action followed
by a belief, in action model logic. This axiom ([7]) is
[M, s]Baψ ↔ pre(s)→
∧
(s,t)∈Ra
Ba[M, t]ψ
In other words, an agent believes ψ after a given action, if ψ holds after any action that is
for a indistinguishable from it. For example, in the epistemic action (M′, ¡), with pre(¡) = ϕ,
for lying public announcement that ϕ, ! is the only accessible action from action ¡, and we
get
[M′, ¡]Baψ ↔ pre(¡)→ Ba[M
′, !]ψ
and therefore (we recall Definition 9)
[¡ϕ]Baψ ↔ ¬ϕ→ Ba[!ϕ]ψ
In view of the identification discussed in this section, in the following we will continue to
call any dynamic modal operator for belief change an epistemic action, and also standardly
represent epistemic actions by their corresponding action models.
7 Unbelievable lies and skeptical agents
If I tell you ϕ and you already believe the opposite, accepting this information will make
your beliefs inconsistent. This is not merely a problem for lying (‘unbelievable lies’) but
for any form of information update. One way to preserve consistent beliefs is to reject new
information if it is inconsistent with your beliefs. (The other way is to accept them, but to
remove inconsistent prior beliefs. See Section 8.) Such agents may be called skeptical. In
this section we adjust the logics of truthful and lying public announcement and of agent
announcement to sceptical agents. This adjustment is elementary. As this topic is alive in
the community of dynamic epistemic logicians we incorporate a review of the literature.
Consistency of beliefs is preserved iff seriality is preserved on epistemic models to in-
terpret these beliefs. For the model classes KD45 and S5 that we target, this is the re-
quirement that the class is closed under information update. The perspective on epistemic
actions and action models from Section 6 is instructive. The class of S5 epistemic models
is closed under update with S5 epistemic actions, such as truthful public announcements,
but the class of KD45 models is not closed under update with KD45 epistemic actions
(see the last paragraph of Section 2). The action models for truthful and lying public
announcement, and for agent announcement, are KD45.
Updates that preserve KD45 have been investigated in [37, 4, 24]. Aucher [4] defines
a language fragment that makes you go mad (‘crazy formulas’). The idea is then to avoid
that. Steiner [37] proposes that the agent does not incorporate the new information if
it already believes to the contrary. In that case, nothing happens. Otherwise, access
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to states where the information is not believed is eliminated, just as for believed public
announcements.13 This solution to model unbelievable lies (and unbelievable truths!) is
similarly proposed in the elegant [24], where it is called ‘cautious update’ — a suitable
term. We will propose to call such agents skeptical instead of cautious.
7.1 Logic of truthful and lying public announcements to skeptical
agents
We propose a three-point action model for truthful and lying public announcement to skep-
tical agents, with the semantics motivated by [37, 24].
Definition 27 (Public announcement to skeptical agents) The action model N for
truthful and lying public announcement to skeptical agents consists of three actions named
!sc, ¡sc, and (for lack of a better symbol) !!sc, with preconditions and accessibility relations
(for all agents a) as follows.
!!sc ¡sc !sc
Ba¬ϕ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬Ba¬ϕ ϕ ∧ ¬Ba¬ϕ
a
a a
For (N, !sc), with pre(!sc) = ϕ ∧ ¬Ba¬ϕ, we write !
scϕ; similarly, we write ¡scϕ for (N, ¡sc)
and !!scϕ for (N, !!sc). ⊣
The difference with the action model for truthful and lying public announcement is that
the alternatives ϕ and ¬ϕ now have an additional precondition ¬Ba¬ϕ: the announcement
should be believable. In the action model there is a separate, disconnected, case for unbe-
lievable announcements: precondition Ba¬ϕ. For unbelievable announcements it does not
matter whether ϕ is a lie or is the truth. The agent chooses to discard it either way. It is
skeptical.
Definition 28 (Axioms) The principles for public announcements to skeptical agents
are:
[!scϕ]Baψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ ¬Ba¬ϕ)→ Ba[!
scϕ]ψ
[¡scϕ]Baψ ↔ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬Ba¬ϕ)→ Ba[!
scϕ]ψ
[!!scϕ]Baψ ↔ Ba¬ϕ→ Baψ ⊣
13Steiner gives an interesting parable for the case where you do not accept new information. Someone
is calling you and is telling you something that you don’t want to believe. What do you do? You start
shouting through the phone: ‘What did you say? Is there anyone on the other side? The connection is
bad!’ And then you hang up, quickly, before the caller can repeat his message. Thus you create common
knowledge (by convention) that the message has been received but its content not accepted.
This analysis comes close but is just off, because to the caller this is indistinguishable from the case
where the message is believable to the addressee and would have been accepted. In the context of [37] the
analysis appears justifiable because the caller is the outside observer who is not modelled. But the outside
observer knows whether the receiver will find the message believable (Proposition 16), unlike in Steiner’s
scenario.
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Proposition 29 The axiomatization of the logic for public announcements to skeptical
agents is complete. ⊣
Proof Directly, from the embedding in action model logic. 
In the case of a single agent, the semantics of an unbelievable announcement of ϕ
leaves the structure of the unbelievable part of the model unchanged. This means that
agent a does not change its beliefs. An unbelievable public announcement does not make
an informative difference for the skeptical agent.
If there are more agents, an announcement can be believable for one agent and un-
believable for another agent. The current action model is no longer appropriate. For
example, for two agents there are seven distinct actions, namely all Boolean combinations
of ϕ, Ba¬ϕ, and Bb¬ϕ, minus one: the cases ϕ∧Ba¬ϕ∧Bb¬ϕ and ¬ϕ∧Ba¬ϕ∧Bb¬ϕ can
be merged into a single action with precondition Ba¬ϕ∧Bb¬ϕ, because they are indistin-
guishable for a and b jointly. Such a two-agent skeptical action model is not a refinement
of the action model above. Unlike the above, it is connected. In particular, the axiom
[!!scϕ]Baψ ↔ Ba¬ϕ→ Baψ is no longer valid, and even when a believes to the contrary,
and therefore does not accept ϕ, its beliefs may still change in another way. For example of
such changing Baψ, if the announcement is that p and I believe that ¬p, but I consider it
possible that you are uncertain about p, then after the announcement I consider it possible
that you now believe p. So for Baψ = Ba¬BaBbp, this was true before and false after the
announcement.
We consider such matters mere variations, and move on.
7.2 Logic of agent announcements to skeptical agents
The analysis becomes more interesting for agent announcements, namely when the speaker
is uncertain whether her lie will be believed by the addressee, as in the consecutive numbers
riddle. Even if the addressee already believes ¬p, he may consider it possible that the
speaker is truthfully announcing p and is not lying. The addressee b then merely concludes
that the speaker a must be mistaken in her truthful announcement of p, and thus believes
¬p ∧ Bap. If a was lying, this belief is mistaken. The charitable addressee discards the
option that the speaker was lying, with precondition Ba¬p.
Definition 30 (Action model for agent announcement to skeptics) The action model
N′ for agent announcements from speaker a to skeptical adressee(s) b is as follows. Assume
transitivity of accessibility relations.
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¡!sca !
sc
a ¡
sc
a
¬(Baϕ ∨ Ba¬ϕ) ∧ ¬Bb¬ϕ Baϕ ∧ ¬Bb¬ϕ Ba¬ϕ ∧ ¬Bb¬ϕ
¡¡!!sca !!
sc
a ¡¡
sc
a
¬(Baϕ ∨ Ba¬ϕ) ∧ Bb¬ϕ Baϕ ∧ Bb¬ϕ Ba¬ϕ ∧ Bb¬ϕ
b b
b b
a a a
a ab a
ab ab ab
For (N′, ¡sca ) with precondition Ba¬ϕ ∧ ¬Bb¬ϕ we write ¡
sc
a ϕ, etc. (Similarly for public
announcement to skeptical agents.) ⊣
This action model encodes that a knows/believes if she’s bluffing, lying, or truthful, but is
uncertain if her announcement is affecting b’s beliefs: she cannot (from the appearance of
the action itself, discarding prior knowledge) distinguish between the actions with precon-
ditions Bb¬ϕ and ¬Bb¬ϕ. In case agent b already believed ¬ϕ, he is indifferent between
the three alternatives truthtelling, lying, and bluffing that ϕ. But in case b considered ϕ
possible, as before, he believes a to be truthful about ϕ.
We only give the reduction axioms for lying, for this logic, and not the remaining
axioms. The more interesting lying axiom is the second one. If formalizes that the lying
agent a may be uncertain if the lie was believable to the addressee b (the two cases on the
right), even if in fact (on the left) the lie was believable. Obviously, the axiomatization is
again complete.
Definition 31 (Axioms) The axioms for a lying to a skeptical agent b, in case a is
believed, are as follows.
[¡sca ϕ]Bbψ ↔ (Ba¬ϕ ∧ ¬Bb¬ϕ)→ Bb[!
sc
a ϕ]ψ
[¡sca ϕ]Baψ ↔ (Ba¬ϕ ∧ ¬Bb¬ϕ)→ (Ba[¡
sc
a ϕ]ψ ∧ Ba[¡¡
sc
a ϕ]ψ) ⊣
Proposition 32 The axiomatization for agent announcement to skeptical agents is com-
plete. ⊣
The logic of agent announcements to skeptical agents can be applied to model the
consecutive numbers riddle. The reader can compare the below to the first announcement
in the first scenario in Section 5. We observe that both models are KD45.
(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a b
ab ab ab ab
• Anne: “I know your number.” Anne is lying
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(0,1) (2,1) (2,3) (4,3) . . .b a b
ab a ab ab
The skeptical Bill continues to be uncertain about Anne’s number. He does not change
his factual beliefs. But he does change his beliefs about Anne’s beliefs. For example, after
Anne’s lie, Bill considers it possible that Anne considers it possible that he believed her.
Informally, this gives Bill reason to believe that Anne has 2 and not 4. If she had 4, she
would know that her lie would not be believed.
8 Lying and plausible belief
We recall the three different attitudes, presented in the introductory Section 1, towards
incorporating announcements ϕ that contradict the beliefs Bb¬ϕ of an addressee b: (i) do
it at the price of inconsistent beliefs (public announcements and agent announcements as
treated in Sections 3 and 4), (ii) reject the information (announcements to skeptical agents,
treated in Section 7), and (iii) accept the information by a consistency preserving process
removing some old beliefs. This section is devoted to the third way. Going mad is too
strong a response, not ever accepting new information seems too weak a response, we now
discuss a solution in between. It involves distinguishing stronger from weaker beliefs, when
revising beliefs. To achieve that, we need to give epistemic models more structure: given a
set of states all considered possible by an agent, it may consider some more plausible than
others, and belief in ϕ can then be defined as the truth of ϕ in the most plausible states
that are considered possible. We now have more options to change beliefs. We can change
the sets of states considered possible by the agent, but we can also change the relative
plausibility of states within that set.
Such approaches for belief change involving plausibility have been proposed in [3, 42,
39, 9]. How to model lying with plausibility models is summarily discussed in [8, 43] (as a
dialogue, these are different contributions to the same volume), and also in [9, p.54].
We continue in the same vein as in the previous sections and present epistemic actions
for plausible (truthful and lying) public announcement, and for plausible (truthful, lying,
and bluffing) agent announcement, by an adjustment of the epistemic actions already
shown. The epistemic action for plausible public lying is the one in [8, 43, 9], the epistemic
action for plausible agent lying applies the general setup of [9] to a specific (plausibility)
action model. Thus it appears we can again present reduction axioms for belief change and
complete axiomatizations for these logics. This is so, but it would involve not just modal
belief operators Baϕ but also conditional belief operators B
ϕ
aψ (if ϕ were true, agent a
would believe ψ; so that Baψ is B
⊤
a ψ), and additional axioms for conditional belief. We
refer to the cited works by Baltag and Smets [8, 9] for further details.
Definition 33 (Plausibility epistemic models) A plausibility epistemic model M =
(S,∼, <, V ) has one more parameter than an epistemic model, namely a plausibility func-
tion < : A → P(S × S). The accessibility relations for each agent are required to be
equivalence relations ∼a. The restriction of <a to an equivalence class of ∼a is required to
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be a prewellorder14. ⊣
As the accessibility relations are equivalence relations, we write ∼a instead of Ra, as before.
If s <a t we say that state s is considered more plausible than state t by agent a. The
transitive clause of <a is ≤a and for (s ≤a t and t ≤a s) we write s =a t (equally plausible).
In this setting we can distinguish knowledge from belief: the agent believes ϕ, iff ϕ
is true in all most plausible equivalent states; and the agent knows ϕ, iff ϕ is true in all
equivalent states.15 We write Baϕ for ‘agent a believes ϕ’, as before. There is a natural way
to associate an accessibility relation with such belief, based on the equivalence relations and
plausibility relations, and we can then define belief in ϕ as the truth of ϕ in all accessible
states, as usual. Defined in this way, these relations for belief satisfy the KD45 properties.
Definition 34 (Accessibility relation and semantics for belief) Given an plausibil-
ity epistemic model M with ∼a and <a, the accessibility relation Ra is defined as:
(s, t) ∈ Ra iff s ∼a t and t ≤a t
′ for all t′ such that s ∼a t
′
Given a plausibility epistemic model M and a state s in its domain, M, s |= Baϕ iff
M, t |= ϕ for all t such that (s, t) ∈ Ra. ⊣
An information update that changes the knowledge of the agents, by way of changing
the relations ∼a, may also affect their beliefs, by way of changing the derived relations Ra.
For example, suppose an agent a is uncertain whether p but considers it more likely that p
is true than that p is false. Without reason, because in fact p is false. The epistemic state
is depicted below, on the left. The arrows in the equivalence relation are dashed lines.
The arrows in the accessibility relation Ra for belief are solid lines, as before. In this state
Bap is true, because p is true in the more plausible state. Now agent a is presented with
hard evidence that ¬p (state elimination semantics, as in truthful public announcement
logic). The state where p is false is eliminated from consideration. The only remaining
state has become the most plausible state. In the epistemic state depicted below on the
right, Ba¬p is true. Agent a has revised her belief that p into belief that ¬p. In this
example, belief changes but knowledge also changes. There are other examples wherein
only belief changes.
¬p p
a
a
aa a
!¬p
⇒ ¬paa
Belief revision consists of changing the plausibility order between states. This induces an
order between deductively closed sets of formulas. The most plausible of these is the set of
formulas that are believed. This belief revision is similar to AGM belief revision, seen as
14A total, transitive, and well-founded relation
15The former represents weak belief and the latter true strong belief. There are yet other epistemic
operators in this setting, safe belief, conditional belief, ... We restrict our presentation to (weak) belief.
31
changing the plausibility order (partial or total order, or prewellorder) between deductively
closed sets of formulas. The contraction that forms part of the revision is with respect to
that order. Dynamic epistemic logics for belief revision were developed to model higher
order belief revision and iterated belief revision.
Just as epistemic actions, with underlying action models, generalize public announce-
ments, plausibility epistemic actions generalize simpler forms of public plausibility updates.
Accessibility relations for ‘considering an action possible’ are computed as in the case of
plausibility epistemic models.
Definition 35 (Plausibility action model) A plausibility action model M = (S,≈,≺
, pre) consists of a domain S of actions, an accessibility function ≈ : A→ P(S× S), where
each ≈a is an equivalence relation, a plausibility function ≺ : A → P(S × S), and a
precondition function pre : S→ LX , where LX is a logical language. The restriction of ≺a
to an equivalence class of ≈a must be a prewellorder. A pointed plausibility action model
is a plausibility epistemic action. ⊣
Definition 36 (Update with a plausibility epistemic action) The update of a plau-
sibility epistemic state with a plausibility epistemic action is computed as the update with-
out plausibilities (see Definition 20), except for the update of the plausibility function that
is defined as:
(s, s) <a (t, t) iff s ≺a t or
s =a t and s <a t
where ≡a means equally plausible for agent a (see after Definition 33). ⊣
See [9] for details. Using these definitions, we propose the following plausibility epistemic
actions for plausible (truthful and lying) public announcement that ϕ and for plausible
(truthtelling, lying, bluffing) agent announcements that ϕ (by agent a to agent b). They
are like the epistemic actions presented in Section 6, but enriched with plausibilities. As
before, the pointed versions of these action models define the appropriate epistemic actions.
Definition 37 (Plausible (truthful and lying) public announcement) Plausible (truth-
ful and lying) public announcements !plϕ and ¡plϕ are the epistemic actions defined by the,
respectively, right/left point of the plausibility action model depicted as follows (where
pre(!pl) = ϕ and pre(!pl) = ¬ϕ).
¡pl !pl
¬ϕ ϕ
a
a
a aa
⊣
Definition 38 (Plausible agent announcement) Plausible (truthful, lying, and bluff-
ing) agent announcements !pla ϕ, ¡
pl
a ϕ and ¡!
pl
a ϕ are the epistemic actions defined by corre-
sponding points of the plausibility action model consisting of points !pla , ¡
pl
a , and ¡!
pl
a , and
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such that !pla ≺b ¡!
pl
a ≺b ¡
pl
a , with universal access for agent b and identity access for agent a,
and with preconditions as visualized below.
¡!pla !
pl
a ¡
pl
a
¬(Baϕ ∨Ba¬ϕ) Baϕ Ba¬ϕ
b b
b b
a ab a
ab ab ab ⊣
Agent b’s equivalence relation is the universal relation. He cannot exclude any of the three
types of announcement. Agent b’s accessibility relation for belief expresses that he considers
it most plausible that a was telling the truth. It does not appear from the visualization that
he considers it more plausible that a was bluffing than that she was lying. The accessibility
relation is the same as in the action model for agent announcement in Section 6. Agent a’s
accessibility relation is the identity on the action model. She knows whether she is lying,
truthtelling, or bluffing.
As in the previous sections, an addressee rather assumes being told the truth than
being told a lie or being bluffed to. But, unlike in the previous sections, we can now also
encode more-than-binary preferences between actions. As lying seems worse than bluffing,
we make it least plausible to interpret an announcement as lying, more plausible that it is
bluffing, and most plausible that it is truthful. That is about as charitable as we can be
as an addressee. This seems to be in accordance with pragmatic practice.
Proposition 39 (Axiomatization and completeness) The logics of plausible public
lying and plausible agent lying have a complete axiomatization. ⊣
Proof This follows from [9, p.51]. The so-called ‘Derived Law of Action-Conditional-
Belief’ is a reduction axiom for the belief postconditions of plausibility epistemic actions.
This axiom involves modalities for belief, for knowledge, and conditional modalities for
belief and for knowledge. The completeness proof consists of rewriting each formula in
the logic to an equivalent formula in the logic of conditional belief (where conditional
knowledge is definable as conditional belief).16 
As an example of a plausible agent announcement, we take Anne’s lying announcement
“I know your number” in the first lying scenario in the consecutive numbers riddle. It
suffices to refer to the depicted execution for skeptical agents in the final paragraph of
Section 7. The accessibility relations for Ba and Bb are as there (after the lie, it remains
the same for the speaker a, and not for addressee b). The equivalence relations for a and
16Given a plausibility epistemic model M and a state s in its domain, define Rϕa as: (s, t) ∈ R
ϕ
a iff
[s ∼a t, t ≤a t
′ for all t′ such that s ∼a t
′, and M, t |= ϕ], and define the semantics of Bϕa as: M, s |= B
ϕ
aψ
iff M, t |= ψ for all t such that (s, t) ∈ Rϕa . We now have that [¡
plϕ]Baϕ ↔ ¬ϕ→ B
ϕ
a [!ϕ]ψ. The axioms
for plausible agent lying are more complex (they also involve conditional knowledge modalities).
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b are the same before and after the lie. It is a coincidence that in this example a skeptical
announcement is a plausible announcement. This is a consequence of the fact that the
initial belief accessibility relations are equivalence relations.
9 Conclusions and further research
Conclusions We presented various logics for an integrated treatment of lying, bluffing,
and truthtelling, where these are considered epistemic actions inducing transformations of
epistemic models. These logics abstract from the moral and intentional aspect of lying,
and only consider fully rational agents and flawless and instantaneous information trans-
mission. We presented versions of such logics that treat lies that contradict the beliefs of
the addressee differently from those that don’t, including a modelling involving plausible
belief. Our main result are the various ‘agent announcement’ logics wherein one agent is
lying to another agent and wherein both are explicitly modelled in the system.
Limitations There are limitations to our approach in view of the analysis and design
of artificially intelligent agents. Explicit agency is missing. This lack is common in dy-
namic epistemic logics. We cannot distinguish agent a truthfully announcing ϕ from an
outsider observer (or a middleman, say, if it concerns a security protocol) announcing Baϕ.
Somewhat more involved, we cannot distinguish agent a lying to agent b that ϕ from a
non-public event differently observed by a and b, but that is not seen as enacted by a.
Frameworks like ATL, ATEL, and STIT have more explicit agency. Bounded rationality
is not modelled. An agent knows if it is lying. It cannot be mistaken in the sense of
announcing an inconsistency of which it is not aware. For not fully rational agents the
computational cost for the liar to remember who he has been lying to, and about what,
is real, and also the computational cost for the listener to check the reliability of new
information. Confidence of belief, related to the previous, is not modelled. This requires a
logic or mechanism of induction, wherein repeated observations or announcements, or by
different agents, make the belief in its content stronger. In our modelling the agents do
either believe the lie completely, or not at all (it abstracts from this process of increasing
or decreasing confidence). Distinguishing transmission noise from intentional noise such
as lies is not modelled, as transmission is assumed instantaneous.
Further research We see the following research directions.
Common knowledge: If agent b believes p as the result of agent a announcing p to b,
we not only have Bbp but also BbCabp: addressee b believes that he and the speaker a
now commonly believe that p. Common belief/knowledge operators allow for more refined
preconditions. A good (and possibly strongest?) precondition for agent a successfully lying
that ϕ to agent b seems:
Ba¬ϕ ∧ ¬Bb¬ϕ ∧ Cab((Baϕ ∨Ba¬ϕ) ∧ ¬(Bbϕ ∨Bb¬ϕ))
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In plain words, the speaker a believes ¬ϕ, the addressee b considers ϕ possible, and the
announcer and addressee commonly believe/know that the announcer is knowledgeable
about ϕ but the adddressee ignorant. Common knowledge logics with dynamic modalities
for information change such as action models are straightforwardly axiomatized by way of
conditional common knowledge [40].
Complexity: The computational cost of lying seems a strong incentive against it. As-
pects of this can also be modelled for perfectly rational agents. For example, in a different
context, the computational cost of insincere voting in social choice theory [12] is intractable
in well-designed voting procedures, so that sincere voting is your best strategy. The com-
plexity of model checking and satisfiability of the logics in this paper is unclear. It seems
likely that the complexity of satisfiability of truthful and lying public announcement logic
is in PSPACE, applying similar results in [27] that builds on [21]. Also, it is unclear how to
measure the complexity of a dynamic epistemic communication protocol that may involve
lies.
Histories: Agents can detect lies, as in the consecutive numbers game, but we do not
model that they adapt their strategies subsequently. History-based structures [31] allow
the adapation of communication strategies to the number of detected (or suspected) past
lies, in the dynamic epistemic setting of perfectly rational agents.
Lying games: Consider knowledge games wherein game states are epistemic states, the
agents are players making informative moves that are epistemic actions, and wherein the
players’ goals are knowledge of facts or other formulas true in the resulting epistemic model.
Such imperfect information games (Bayesian games) with modal logic are presented in [1].
We wish to investigate lying games in this setting, such that each announcement can be
either the truth or a lie, and where a high negative payoff is associated with the detection
of a lie.
Final frontiers In multi-agent systems with several agents one may investigate how
robust certain communication procedures are in the presence of few liars, or in the presence
of a few lies (as in Ulam games [32]). A challenge towards philosophy is how to model
a liar’s paradox. In a dynamic epistemic logic this is problematic. However, promising
progress towards that is reported in [26].
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